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ABSTRACT
The nexus between corporate disclosure and credit market devel-
opment as well as whether the nexus is sensitive to the income 
classification of countries is not well delineated in the empirical 
literature. The objective of this paper is to interrogate these issues. 
In addressing these important issues, we rely on a panel of 122 
countries and deploy a battery of econometric techniques. 
Generally, we find that corporate disclosure promotes credit market 
development. The results from the analysis of subsamples suggest 
that the effect of corporate disclosure on credit market develop-
ment is sensitive to creditor rights protection and the income status 
of a country. In particular, there is evidence that the interaction 
between corporate disclosure and creditor rights protection signif-
icantly benefits the credit markets only in upper-middle-income 
countries.
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In this paper, we use data from 122 countries to answer two related questions. First, does 
corporate disclosure1 significantly influence credit market development2? Second, does 
the effect of corporate disclosure on credit market development differ according to the 
income groups of countries? Given the known link between credit market development 
and economic growth, it is crucial to ask these questions because answers to them have 
the potential to shape economic policy.
The literature documents that the development of credit markets (banking sector) drives 
economic growth positively (Beck & Levine, 2004). One major obstacle to credit market 
development is information asymmetry. “A reduction in information asymmetry, and 
hence in the monitoring burden between agent and principal, is one of the aims of the 
regulation of financial reporting disclosure in active capital markets” (Marshall & 
Weetman, 2002, p.31). In credit markets, information asymmetry refers to an imbalance 
of information between the lender and the prospective borrower in which the latter uses 
their superior information to the detriment of the former. It creates adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems that drive credit risk with a possible financial crisis. Trombetta and 
Imperatore (2014) define financial crisis as “an interruption in the normal functioning of 
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1We use corporate disclosure and corporate transparency interchangeably in this paper.
2We use financial development and credit market development interchangeably in this paper
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financial markets.” (p.207). According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), credit rationing may 
exist in competitive credit markets as a result of adverse selection emanating from the 
inability of lenders to adequately appraise the projects prospective borrowers present to 
them. Apart from credit rationing, insufficient information about clients in credit markets 
may usually compel lenders to charge sub-prime interest rates that have the potential of 
creating more loan defaults and delinquencies, leading to a financial crisis.
Institutional arrangements such as private credit bureaus, public credit registries, and 
legal regimes that protect creditors are known to mitigate the ills of information 
asymmetry in credit markets and, thus, support credit market development. Their effects 
on financial access, cost of finance and credit risk have attracted some considerable 
research albeit uncertain outcomes (Asongu, 2017; Behr & Sonnekalb, 2012; Djankov, 
McLiesh, & Shleifer, 2007; Doblas-Madrid & Minetti, 2013; Ghosh, 2019; Grajzl & 
Laptieva, 2016; Jappelli & Pagano, 2006, 2002; Kusi, Agbloyora, Ansah-Adub, & Gyeke- 
Dakoa, 2017; Nakamuraa & Roszbach, 2018; Nana, 2014). What remains unclear in the 
empirical literature is the effect of corporate disclosure on credit market development. To 
accelerate economic growth and development through the channeling of credit to the 
private sector, the question of whether the transparency of the sector in terms of 
provision of accurate and timely ownership as well as financial information accelerates 
or stymies credit market development is crucial. According to Healy and Palepu (2001), 
corporate transparency represents one of the fundamental indicators of good corporate 
governance. When the governance systems of firms ensure transparency, lenders are 
motivated to offer financial assistance to them, ceteris paribus. This is because informa-
tion availability bites the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders and 
enables investors to evaluate corporate performance (Cheung, Jiang, & Tan, 2010).
As far as we know, papers that have studied corporate disclosure have not considered its 
effect on credit market development. Recent ones have considered issues such as the impact 
of boardroom gender diversity on corporate sustainability disclosures (Zahid et al., 2019); 
corporate disclosure quality and institutional investors’ holdings during market downturns 
(Cheng, Huang, & Luo, 2020); how firm size affects corporate social responsibility report 
disclosure (Ting, 2020); how the quantity of information in corporate disclosures affects the 
efficiency with which investors incorporate newly acquired information into stock prices 
(Chung, Hrazdil, Novak, & Suwanyangyuan, 2019); the effect of financial reporting and 
disclosure on corporate investment (Roychowdhury, Shroff, & Verdi, 2019); and how board 
gender diversity is associated with biodiversity disclosures of a firm (Haque & Jones, 2020). 
Consequently, we postulate that some knowledge lacuna exists as to the effect of corporate 
disclosure on credit market development. We attempt to illuminate this murky area of the 
empirical literature using country-level data from 122 countries.
The relevance of corporate disclosure to financial markets has attracted both policy 
and academic interest. In the United States of America, for example, the need for 
corporate disclosure received a significant boost in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. The understanding is that these legislations 
will create an environment that will produce sufficient public information needed to aid 
optimal capital allocation decisions. The underlying reasoning is that information influ-
ences the decision-making processes of individuals in households, businesses, and 
governments (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). Financial reporting, for 
instance, carries benefits such as “better investment, credit, and similar resource 
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allocation decisions, which in turn result in more efficient functioning of the capital 
markets and lower costs of capital for the economy as a whole.” (FASB Financial 
Accounting Series, 2006, p.35). In stock markets, better disclosure practices decrease 
information asymmetry. Such practices are characterized by reduced uncertainty, 
enhanced liquidity, and weakened impacts of crises (Cheng et al., 2020). Studies on the 
information-investment connection (e.g., Diamond & Verricchia, 1991; Easley & O’Hara, 
2004) suggest that opaque firms are unattractive to uninformed investors due to their 
higher risk. Lawrence (2013) reports that individual investors commit more funds to 
firms with clear and concise financial disclosures.
The application of a bouquet of econometric analytical techniques to a panel dataset 
from 122 countries has produced some interesting results which show that corporate 
disclosure is associated with credit market development positively. It suggests that an 
improvement in the transparency of the corporate world translates into more access to 
credit. Further analysis through the segregation of the sample into income groups reveals 
that corporate disclosure significantly propels the development of credit markets in high- 
income, upper-middle-income and lower-middle-income countries. In contrast, corpo-
rate disclosure does not support credit market development in low-income countries. 
Besides, the various estimations implemented provide results suggesting that creditor 
rights protection weakens the effects of corporate disclosure on credit market develop-
ment. We have explained this in terms of the liquidation bias hypothesis where in an 
effective legal regime that guarantees creditor rights, managers of transparent firms may 
show some signs of reluctance towards debt financing for fear of liquidation of their firms 
should default occur, which leads to a fall in credit market development.
The value addition of this study to the existing literature is three-fold. First, previous 
studies on disclosure (e.g., Chauhan & Kumar, 2018; Chen, Li, Hu, & Hu, 2019; Cheng 
et al., 2020; Goldstein & Yang, 2019; Haque & Jones, 2020; Rezaee & Tuo, 2017; Srairi, 
2019; Ting, 2020; Tsai, Tu, & Hung, 2016) have not specifically tackled the effect of 
corporate disclosure on credit market development. We demonstrate from our data that 
corporate disclosure accelerates credit market development. Generally, we observe this 
outcome even when we disintegrate our data into income groups. Theoretically, these 
results uphold signaling theory and emphasize the point that increased firm transparency 
constitutes one of the channels for credit market development.
Second, we are unaware of any previous study that answers the question of whether 
the effect of corporate disclosure on credit market development differs according to 
income groups of countries. We show that credit markets in high-income, upper-middle- 
income countries and lower-middle-income countries are more likely to benefit from the 
increased transparency of firms significantly. For low-income countries, rising corporate 
disclosure is likely to trigger a drop in the volume of credit. We believe that these findings 
provide policy direction to the countries in these income groups. From the theoretical 
point of view, our results suggest that the positive effect of corporate disclosure on the 
financial markets of a country is sensitive to the income status of the country.
Third, the study demonstrates that in the presence of creditor rights protection, the 
positive effect of corporate disclosure plummets. It suggests that corporate disclosure and 
creditor rights protection are not complementary. For credit market development, this 
finding implies that a simultaneous pursuit of interventions aimed at achieving corporate 
transparency and a legal regime that protects the rights of creditors may not be necessary. 
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As we are not aware of any study that provides this outcome, we believe this finding 
provides some direction to policymakers in the study countries.
2. Literature review
2.1. Theoretical review
Credited to Spence (1973, 2002), signaling theory is about intentional communication of 
positive information to convey favorable organizational attributes (Connelly et al., 2011). 
It posits that information disclosed by corporate entities has a signaling effect. We deploy 
this theory to posit that corporate disclosure should drive credit market development 
positively. The reason is that the risk profiles of firms are more likely to improve as they 
become more transparent through disclosure of clear, concise, and timely ownership and 
financial information. This may facilitate their access to credit on favorable terms in three 
ways. First, if the disclosed information favorably projects the firm as low credit risk, it is 
likely to access credit at lower interest rates. Second, since lenders are likely to spend less 
in the entire credit underwriting process (prospecting, evaluation, monitoring, and 
recovery) when firms are transparent, they can adequately discriminate between credit 
applicants and accordingly charge fair interest rates. Thus, corporate disclosure should 
increase credit market development, ceteris paribus. Third, as the transparency of firms 
rises, creditors feel safe to supply more funds because they are armed with sufficient 
information that will enable them to enforce their rights should borrowers default.
However, corporate disclosure may not always be in the best interest of firms. The 
Hirshleifer (1971) effect articulates that disclosure may signify harmful consequences for 
economic agents in terms of risk-sharing opportunities. It occurs when the disclosed 
information is misconstrued by its users resulting in wrong conclusions. In other words, 
corporate disclosure may lead to a wrong interpretation of some specific information 
about a firm’s financial conditions resulting in either a credit denial or payment of higher 
interest rates that encumbers credit applications. This reduces the volume of credit, 
holding other factors constant. Thus, corporate disclosure may undermine credit market 
development. In other words, corporate disclosure may drive credit market development 
negatively. Studies in the banking industry, such as Goldstein and Sapra (2013) and 
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004), suggest that disclosure may be 
counterproductive.
2.2. Review of related studies
The effect of corporate disclosure (financial, non-financial, voluntary, and non- 
voluntary) on some outcomes and features has received some attention in the empirical 
literature. Apart from the model of Tassel (2011) pointing to the elimination of compe-
titive advantage when a bank discloses information about its loan clients, it also reveals 
that disclosure of information offers the disclosing bank the opportunity to raise external 
funds at a lower cost. It observes that the incentive to disclose information is negatively 
associated with a bank’s capital ratio and positively correlates with the number of other 
competing banks that disclose information. Using a sample of 29 Islamic banks in five 
Gulf Cooperation Council countries over the period 2013–2016, Srairi (2019) shows that 
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an improvement in transparency significantly impacts banks’ stability. Goldstein and 
Leitner (2018) study optimal disclosure policy of banks and conclude that corporate 
disclosure can hurt risk-sharing opportunities for banks, thus, confirming the Hirshleifer 
(1971) effect of information disclosure. Bose, Saha, Khan, and Islam (2017) investigate 
the relationship between financial inclusion disclosure and firm performance in 
Bangladeshi banks from 2009 to 2014 and find that the relationship is positive and 
moderated by market competition and government ownership.
Chauhan and Kumar (2018) use Bloomberg’s score on the extent of a firm’s 
Environmental, Social, and Governance disclosures to proxy non-financial disclosure 
and examine its effect on firm value with data from Indian firms. They observe that non- 
financial corporate disclosure exhibits positive firm valuation effects. They show that 
non-financial disclosure is more useful to stand-alone firms than business group firms. 
Plumlee, Brown, Hayes, and Marshall (2015) use listed firms from five US industries (oil 
& gas, chemical, food/beverage, pharmaceutical and electric utilities) from the years 2000 
to 2005 to examine the connection between voluntary environmental disclosure and firm 
value. They show that voluntary disclosure quality is associated with firm value (i.e., cash 
flow and cost of equity components of firm value). Guay, Samuels, and Taylor (2016) 
examine whether managers use voluntary disclosure to mitigate the adverse effects of 
financial statement complexity on the information environment and report a robust 
positive link between financial statement complexity and voluntary disclosure. The paper 
suggests that firms use voluntary disclosure to abate the harmful effects of financial 
statement complexity on the information environment. Rezaee and Tuo (2017) find 
a two-directional link between non-financial disclosures and sustainability performance.
Chen et al. (2019) use data from China to interrogate the roles of quality of corporate 
disclosure and property rights in the allocation of different types of bank credit. They find 
that foreign banks and policy banks practice “financial discrimination”. They also report 
that apart from local commercial banks, large state-owned commercial banks, national 
joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks practicing 
financial discrimination, such institutions also offer significant ”financial support” to 
non-state-owned enterprises. However, when enterprises violate corporate disclosure 
requirements, the local commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city com-
mercial banks, and rural commercial banks overturn their credit decisions and start to 
exhibit a financial discrimination attitude towards non-state-owned enterprises. Allaya, 
Derouiche, and Muessig (2018) use data (2007–2013) from 440 French listed firms to 
investigate the effect of voluntary disclosure on corporate debt maturity and find that 
firms with higher voluntary disclosure record more long-maturity debt. In other words, 
as the voluntary disclosure of a listed firm improves, its chances of accessing long-term 
credit also improve.
Goldstein and Yang (2019) investigate the effect of corporate disclosure on real 
efficiency and observe that when disclosure relates to a variable a real decision-maker 
is interested in, disclosure negatively influences real efficiency. On the other hand, when 
disclosure concerns a variable that the real decision-maker is already informed about, it 
always improves price informativeness and real efficiency (Goldstein & Yang, 2019). Kim 
and Yasuda (2018) find that the introduction of mandatory business risk disclosure 
negatively impacts the total risk of a firm, implying that an improvement in mandatory 
business risk disclosure reduces a firm’s cost of capital. Tsai et al. (2016) report that more 
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news coverage and negative news sentiment worsen credit risk and that an increase in the 
volume of risk factor disclosure in corporate filings is associated with higher credit risk 
for debt issuers.
Recent studies including Cheng et al. (2020); Haque and Jones (2020); Ting (2020); 
Roychowdhury et al. (2019); Zahid et al. (2019); Chung et al. (2019), and Susana and 
Gwendolyn (2017) have also considered corporate disclosure from diverse perspectives. 
Lacking from these studies is the effect of corporate disclosure on credit market devel-
opment. This represents a gap which we seek to fill. Given the fact that previous studies 
on disclosure have primarily focused on firm-level data, apart from our study bridging 
this gap, the use of data from 122 countries across the globe gives us the unique 
opportunity to shape policy at both micro and macro levels.
3. Data, sample and model
We collect data (2013 to 2017) from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators at 
(www.worldbank.org) and World Governance Indicators at http://info.worldbank.org/ 
governance/wgi/index.asp. We collect regulatory quality data from the latter. The rest of 
the data have come from the former.
We use two criteria to build our sample. First, for inclusion in the sample, a country 
must have at least three-year domestic credit data in the study period. Second, the 
country must have at least three-year non-negative data on the primary explanatory 
variable (corporate disclosure) and the control variables used in the study. These selec-
tion criteria yield data from 122 countries. We argue the global representativeness of the 
sample on the ground that every region is represented. We provide details of these 
countries and their regions in Appendix A.
One main factor has informed our decision to focus on the 2013–2017 period. At the 
time of data collection, data on credit information sharing and creditor rights index, that 
are variables of interest in this study covered 2013 to 2017. The use of 2013–2017 data, in 
our view, offers a significant benefit of producing results that are isolated from the 
possible influence of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis.
3.1. The variables
The dependent variable is credit market development (Credit). It is measured by the 
credit to the private sector as a share of GDP. Measuring credit market development by 
credit to the private sector as a share of GDP is appropriate because it is in line with the 
empirical literature. Studies such as Adusei (2019), Adeleye, Osabuohien, Bowale, 
Matthew, and Oduntan (2018); Ang and Kumar (2014), and Do and Levchenko (2007) 
have used it to measure financial development.
The primary explanatory variable is corporate disclosure (CorpDiscl). We measure it 
by the extent of business disclosure index. The index captures the extent to which 
investors are protected through ownership and financial information disclosure. It 
takes into account the review and approval requirements for related-party transactions 
as well as internal, immediate, and periodic disclosure requirements for related party 
transactions. It ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values representing a higher disclosure. In 
line with signaling theory, we expect it to drive credit market development positively.
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Nonperforming loans (NPLs) as a share of total gross loans of a country is one of the 
control variables in our model. The significance of nonperforming loans as a share of 
total gross loans in credit markets is documented in the empirical literature (Ghosh, 
2019). Indeed, annual changes in nonperforming loans as a share of total gross loans are 
seen as “a warning indicator of banking system fragility” (Guérineau & Léon, 2019). We 
hypothesize the negative effect of nonperforming loans on credit market development in 
the sense that an increase in the incidence of nonperforming bank loans creates a burden 
on financial intermediaries, leading to a reduction in credit availability.
We include GDP per capita (Income) in the analysis to account for economic devel-
opment. We expect it to drive credit market development positively. We anchor this 
expectation on the premise that, holding other factors constant, economic development 
fuels more economic and investment activities which provide opportunities for indivi-
duals and firms to seek more debt financing. We include trade openness measured by 
imports plus exports as a share of GDP in our model because an open economy through 
liberalization promotes lending via capital inflows, which is likely to boost credit avail-
ability, ceteris paribus. Hence, we expect a positive coefficient.
We use regulatory quality as an institutional control to account for regulatory 
checks and balances. The efficiency of regulatory bodies gives confidence and creates 
an enabling environment for financial intermediation which impacts positively on the 
volume of credit. Regulatory quality of a country is measured on a scale ranging from 
−2.5 to 2.5, with the higher positive values suggesting a better regulatory 
environment.
Studies on information asymmetry demonstrate the importance of credit information 
sharing in credit markets and banking system fragility (Asongu, 2017; Biswas, 2019; 
Djankov et al., 2007; Ghosh, 2019; Grajzl & Laptieva, 2016; Guérineau & Léon, 2019; 
Jappelli & Pagano, 2002; Nakamuraa & Roszbach, 2018; Nana, 2014). Credit information 
sharing is an index which measures “rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and quality of 
credit information available through public or private credit registries.” It ranges from 0 
to 8 with higher values indicating the availability of more credit information from either 
public or private bureaus to aid lending decisions. We expect it to influence credit market 
development positively.
Bank capital plays an essential role in financial intermediation. We account for it in 
this study by the bank capital to total assets ratio. We expect it to drive credit market 
development positively in the sense that an increase in the ratio lowers operating costs of 
banks (Belkhir, Naceur, Chami, & Samet, 2019) leading to more lending.
The credit markets in a given country are significantly determined by the extent of 
legal protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002). Strong investor 
protection laws and their enforcement induce investors to increase fund availability 
because they feel protected against abuse of their funds. The theoretical literature posits 
that in the presence of strong investor protection laws and their enforcement, outside 
investors exhibit readiness to pay more for financial assets such as equity and debt. This is 
because they know that, with better legal protection, they will access a greater share of the 
firm’s profits as interest or dividends (La Porta et al., 2002). The study controls for 
creditor rights protection (Rights) by the strength of legal rights index which ranges from 
0 to 12. The index gauges the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the 
rights of borrowers and lenders. Higher values of the index indicate that the laws are 
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better designed to promote access to credit. We, therefore, expect creditor rights protec-
tion to drive credit market development positively, ceteris paribus.
Apart from the above, we also explore whether creditor rights protection significantly 
moderates the relationship between corporate disclosure and credit market development. 
It is projected that corporate transparency in the presence of effective creditor rights 
protection laws should accelerate credit market development. The intuition is that in an 
environment where firms are transparent, creditors should not find it difficult to dis-
criminate between credit applications due to information availability. And with the 
opportunity of seeking a judicial intervention to recover their funds in case of breach 
of credit contracts available, creditors will be willing to supply loanable funds. 
Consequently, it is expected that the interaction between corporate disclosure and 
creditor rights protection should propel the growth of the credit markets in the study 
countries, ceteris paribus.
Table 1 shows a summary of the variables, measurements, expected signs, and sources.
3.2. The model
To investigate the effect of corporate disclosure on credit market development and 
whether the effect differs significantly across income status of countries, we adapt the 
analytical framework of Adeleye and Eboagu (2019). It involves a two-part procedure 
such that in the first part, we analyze the full sample of 122 countries. In contrast, in 
the second part, we divide the full sample into four subsamples of income groups: high 
(45), upper-middle (38), lower-middle (28), and low (11) income countries. These 
procedures help us find answers to our research questions. Except for corporate dis-
closure (CorpDiscl), regulatory quality (Reg) and credit information sharing (Info), we 
log-transform all variables to control for outliers and establish elasticity relationships. 
With Credit as the dependent variable, and CorpDiscl as the main explanatory variable, 
equation [1] models the marginal impact of corporate disclosure on credit market 
development: 
ln Creditit ¼ β0 þ γln Z
0
it þ β1CorpDisclit þ dt þ eit
eit ¼ vi þ uitð Þ
(1) 






Credit to the private sector (% of GDP) N/A WDI





Non-performing loans (% of GDP) Negative -do-
Income GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) Positive -do-
Trade openness Trade (% of GDP) Positive -do-
Regulatory quality Regulatory Quality (−2.5 weak; +2.5 strong) Positive WGI
Information sharing Depth of credit information index (0 = low to 8 = high) Positive WDI
Bank capital Bank capital to total assets ratio (% of GDP) Positive -do-
Creditor rights The strength of legal rights index is the proxy for creditor rights, and it 
ranges between 0 to 12
Positive -do-
Note: N/A: not applicable; WDI: World Development Indicators; WGI: World Governance Indicators 
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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where eit the composite error term; vi represents individual-specific unobserved hetero-
geneity that is time-invariant; uit is the idiosyncratic error term that is independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d); lnCreditit is the natural logarithm of credit market devel-
opment proxied by credit to the private sector; Z0itis the vector of baseline control 
variables (per capita GDP, non-performing loans, trade openness, regulatory quality, 
credit information sharing, bank capital to total assets ratio); CorpDisclit is the main 
regressor; dt indicates time-specific dummies controlling for variation of the dependent 
variable; i is the number of countries in sample 1; 2; . . . ;N; t is the number of years 
1; 2; . . . ;T. Equation [1] tests the hypothesis that corporate disclosure impacts credit 
market development while controlling for other macroeconomic indicators. In essence, it 
evaluates the marginal impact of corporate disclosure on credit market development, 
holding other variables in the model constant. In line with the theoretical postulation of 
La Porta et al. (2002), we incorporate creditor’s rights into Equation [1]. This variable is 
included to capture how fund providers react when laws empower them enforce their 
rights in the event of loan default. This relationship is as specified in Equation [2]: 
ln Creditit ¼ β0 þ γln Z
0
it þ β1CorpDisclit þ β2Rightsit þ dt þ eit (2) 
Further, we hypothesize that creditor rights protection represents a channel through 
which corporate disclosure impacts credit market development. We test this hypothesis 
by adding the interaction of corporate disclosure with creditor’s rights to Equation [2] 
which becomes: 
ln Creditit ¼ β0 þ γln Z
0
it þ β1CorpDisclit þ β2Rightsit þ β3CorpDiscl � Rightsit þ dt
þ et
(3) 
To answer the question of whether the effect of corporate disclosure on credit market 
development differs according to income groups, our sample is categorized into high, upper- 
middle, lower-middle and low-income countries and Equations [1] to [3] are augmented 
accordingly.
3.3. Estimation approach
In sequential order, we engage equations [1] to [3] by applying (1) the least-squares dummy 
variable, (2) fixed effects, and (3) random effects techniques for the full sample and across 
the four income groups. This empirical approach is employed to observe the consistency of 
the main regressor, CorpDiscl, on the dependent variable using different model specifica-
tions. From Torres-Reyna (2007) and Baum (2013), the least-squares dummy variable 
(LSDV) model provides a good way to understanding fixed effects. This technique allows 
the effect of CorpDiscl be mediated by the differences across cross-sectional units in the 
panel using dummy variables. Also, by adding the dummy for each cross-section, the pure 
impact of CorpDiscl is estimated having controlled for unobserved heterogeneity, vi. In 
essence, each dummy absorbs the effects particular to each income group.3 Although the 
3We use income groups rather than country dummies because the latter will require 122 dummy variables which will 
significantly weaken the efficiency of the estimator. Hence, four income group dummies are created which align with 
the objectives of this paper. The dummy for high-income countries is the base income group dummy variable.
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LSDV technique assumes that the cross-sections have similar characteristics and errors are 
independent, we augment the procedure with the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust 
standard error-type technique, which accounts for cross-sectional dependence. It uses the 
ordinary least squares/weighted least squares4 and fixed effects (within) regression and 
computes spatial correlation consistent (PSCC) standard errors for linear panel models. 
These estimators correct the standard errors of the coefficient estimates for possible 
dependence (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005; Hoechle, 2006).
However, if the respective individual-specific unobserved effects correlate with the 
regressors, whenE viCorpDisclit;Z0itð Þ�0, and the errors also correlate over time, the 
LSDV becomes inconsistent, and Equation [1] yields biased estimates. This is because, if 
a possible correlation of regression errors across time is ignored, biased inferences will 
occur (Adeleye & Eboagu, 2019). Next, we deploy the random effects (RE) technique 
which may be suitable because some of the variables (corporate disclosure, regulatory 
quality, credit information sharing, creditor rights) in our models are either slowly 
changing or time-invariant. However, we need to assume that the time-invariant or 
slowly changing covariates in our RE model are not correlated with the unobserved 
individual-specific effects. If this assumption does not hold, the RE estimator produces 
inconsistent and biased estimates and the fixed effects (FE) model, which allows for 
dealing with possible unobserved heterogeneity in the data, then becomes suitable. To 
address the problem of causality and endogeneity, we use the first lag of explanatory 
variables instead of incorporating them contemporaneously in the models.
We further check the issue of endogeneity by converting our baseline model into 
a dynamic model and estimating it by the two-step system generalized method of 
moments (SYS-GMM) estimation technique. This estimation technique is credited to 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). It uses moment conditions 
(instruments) that do not correlate with the regressors in the adopted model. The use of 
many instruments results in high asymptotic efficiency. However, it may lead to high bias 
(Donald, Imbens, & Newey, 2009). Consequently, to prevent instrument proliferation, we 
implement the collapse technique (Adusei & Sarpong-Danquah, 2021). The reliability of 
the estimated results is tested by Hansen and Arellano-Bond autocorrelation statistics. 
The former statistic is used to test the validity of the instruments used whilst the latter is 
used to assess the serial correlation of the error term.
4. Results and discussions
This section sequentially details the various estimations carried out. It begins with the 
presentation and discussion of correlation analysis and descriptive statistics followed by 
econometric results which are in two parts: full sample (122 countries) and subsample 
(four income groups – high, upper-middle, lower-middle and low) analyses.
4.1. Correlation analysis and summary of statistics
The pairwise correlation matrix checks the presence or otherwise of multicollinearity 
problem in the data. We report the results in the upper panel of Table 2. The low 
4Weighted least squares
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correlations between pairs of explanatory variables support the conclusion that multi-
collinearity is not an issue in this study. Worthy of comment is the positive and 
statistically significant correlation between corporate disclosure and credit market devel-
opment. It suggests that rising levels of corporate disclosure are associated with some 
improvement in credit market development. Similarly, except for nonperforming loans 
and bank capital, the control variables exhibit positive and statistically significant corre-
lations with credit market development.
The lower panel of Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the variables. In all, it is 
observable that there are no outliers in the data because, for all the variables, there is no 
significant deviation from the mean. It suggests that our results may not be biased by the 
presence of outliers in the data.
4.2. Credit market and corporate disclosure: full sample
The results presented in Table 3 show the outcomes from three estimation techniques – 
LSDV, RE and FE. Columns [1], [4], [7] relate to Equation [1], columns [2], [5], [8] 
report estimations of equation [2] while columns [3], [6], [9] relate to Equation [3]. We 
explain all the results simultaneously. As discussed earlier, this approach is such that each 
technique serves as robustness to one another. The diagnostics reported under the results 
are useful. The R-squared which captures the variations in the dependent variable 
explained by the regressors ranges between 0.21 and 0.99. The F- and Wald statistics 
indicate that the regressors are jointly significant in explaining credit market 
development.
Across all model specifications and for the most part, corporate disclosure consistently 
exhibits a positive and statistically significant effect on credit market development. The 
implication is that an increase in corporate disclosure results in an improvement in the 
volume of credit. Holding other factors constant, a point increase in the corporate 
disclosure index of a country causes between 3% and 4% increase in credit market 
development at the 1% significance level, ceteris paribus. It strikes a chord with signaling 
theory, which generally predicts a positive link between corporate transparency and 
credit market development. Better disclosure practices lower information asymmetry, 
which reduces uncertainty and enhances liquidity and credit volume (Cheng et al., 2020). 
With increased disclosure, lenders can critically review loan applications, prune out 
potentially risky proposals and extend credit to those considered less risky with appreci-
able returns. In essence, the quantity of information in corporate disclosures influences 
the efficiency with which funders incorporate newly acquired information into credit 
evaluation (Chung et al., 2019). Investors rely on periodic disclosures from firms that 
may ultimately be beneficial for setting interest rates and credit volume (Bloxham, 2014). 
Overall, our findings align with previous studies (Leuz & Schrand, 2009; Vayanos, 2004), 
who argue that firms with better corporate disclosures are more attractive to investors 
due to greater transparency
For the control variables, the coefficient of income is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% and 5% levels. On average, a percentage change in income is associated with between 
0.24% and 0.32% increase in credit volume, ceteris paribus. Therefore, our prediction of 
a positive effect is supported. One possible explanation for this finding is that more income 
increases the marginal propensity to consume in an economy, holding other factors constant. 
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The multiplier effect of the rise in consumption on aggregate demand is likely to increase the 
productive capacities of firms which create the incentive to demand more credit. This leads to 
a rise in credit market development. Another explanation is that an improvement in income 
generally facilitates debt servicing, which incentivizes lenders to lend more.
Similarly, economic openness is positive and statistically significant at the 1% sig-
nificance level. It suggests that, on average, credit increases by 0.04% to 0.05% if 
a percentage change in the degree of openness of an economy occurs, ceteris paribus. 
Holding other factors constant, when an economy is open to the rest of the world (as 
captured by economic openness), it opens up more trade opportunities for firms to 
expand production. The expansion in production may trigger more demand for credit, 
leading to an increase in lending activities in credit markets.
Nonperforming loans create a burden on the profit margin of financial intermediaries 
due to mandatory provision on nonperforming loans. This necessitates a reduction in 
credit volume (Klein, 2013). Consequently, we have predicted that non-performing loans 
should slow down credit market development. Contrary to this prediction, the coefficient 
of non-performing loans is statistically insignificant across the three estimation techni-
ques. The implication is that our prediction is unsupported.
Bank capital exhibits a negative and statistically significant relation with credit market 
development at the 1% significance level. On average, a percentage change in bank capital 
causes between 40% and 44% reduction in credit market development, ceteris paribus. 
Another control variable that also exerts a positive and statistically significant effect on 
credit market development is regulatory quality. It explains between 0.0464 and 0.0616 
variation in credit market development, holding other factors constant. Thus, our 
prediction of a positive effect is confirmed. Regulation injects sanity and curtails excesses 
in credit markets, resulting in their improvement, ceteris paribus.
Credit information sharing comes up as supporting credit market development. 
Holding other factors constant, a unit increase in a country’s credit information sharing 
index causes between 4% and 5% increase in credit at the 1% significance level. This 
outcome aligns with the existing literature. Credit information sharing tackles informa-
tion asymmetry (Ghosh, 2019) and frees up credit markets. In countries where credit 
information bureaus (public or private) work effectively, information sharing enables 
lenders to avoid borrowers with questionable credit histories as well as adequately price 
credit risk, which culminates in more credit.
The coefficient of creditor rights aligns with our expectation. It is positive across all 
models but statistically significant only in four out of six. It predicts between 0.01% and 
0.02% variation in credit market development. This gives the indication that strong 
investor laws that uphold the rights of fund providers propel them to support the 
development of the credit market. However, the coefficient of the interaction term is 
statistically not significant.
Lastly, the negative coefficient of the dummy for low-income countries is the only 
statistically significant coefficient. It suggests that credit markets in low-income countries 
are less developed than those in high-income countries which accords with conventional 
wisdom.5
5The intercept in each model of columns [1] to [3] represents the coefficient of the dummy variable for high-income 
countries.
218 M. ADUSEI AND N. ADELEYE
4.3. Credit market and corporate disclosure: income groups
In this section, we interrogate the question of whether the effect of corporate disclosure 
on credit market development differs according to the income status of countries. To do 
this, we segregate the dataset into four income groups: high, upper-middle, lower-middle 
and low-income countries and perform new estimations the results of which we report in 
Tables 4, 5 and 6. Table 4 presents the results from the LSDV technique for all income 
groups. Table 5 displays results from FE and RE techniques for high- and upper–middle- 
income country subsamples, while Table 6 shows those from lower–middle and low- 
income country subsamples. For the LSDV results, each column represents estimations 
from Equations [1], [2], and [3] while those of FE and RE techniques are limited to 
estimations from equations [2] and [3]. For space, interpretation is limited to corporate 
disclosure, creditor rights and the interaction term.
Corporate disclosure displays a complex structure across the income groups. Under 
the LSDV technique displayed in Table 4, the coefficient exhibits mixed signs amidst 
varying statistical significance for high-, lower–middle- and low-income countries, but it 
is consistently positive and statistically significant in upper–middle-income countries. 
For the FE and RE techniques shown in Tables 5 and 6, the coefficient is steadily negative 
in upper–middle and lower–middle-income countries while its behavior is irregular in 
high- and low-income countries.
Excluding creditor’s rights and the interaction term, we observe in Table 4 that the 
coefficient of corporate disclosure is positive and statistically significant for all but low- 
income countries. Consistent with findings from the full sample, a point increase in the 
corporate disclosure index of a country causes between 2% and 5% increase in credit 
market development, ceteris paribus. Generally, a negative coefficient as in upper–mid-
dle-income countries (FE model) suggests that its improvement slows down credit 
market development. Approximately, between 3% and 6% reduction in credit market 
development occurs in upper-middle-income countries when there is a point increase in 
the corporate disclosure index, ceteris paribus. The negative coefficient of corporate 
disclosure aligns with the Hirshleifer (1971) effect which articulates that disclosure may 
signify harmful consequences for economic agents. It occurs when the disclosed infor-
mation is misconstrued by its users resulting in wrong conclusions. Disclosure may yield 
adverse outcomes if information overload impairs the capacities of investors and funders 
to process or synthesize information (O’Reilly, 1980; Simon, 1978). In other words, 
extensive disclosures can impair rather than enhance the efficiency of allocation of credit 
(Madhavan & Prescott, 1995).
From Table 4, the statistical significance of corporate disclosure diminishes with the 
inclusion of creditor’s rights in all but upper–middle-income countries. Disclosure exerts 
disproportionate relevance with the inclusion of the interaction term across all the 
income groups, though with varying signs. This scenario allows for the computation of 
the total impact6 of corporate disclosure on the credit market given creditor’s rights. 
Largely, the overall impact is computed at the average, minimum and maximum values of 
creditor’s rights.
6Overall impact of corporate disclosure on credit market development in high-income countries is calculated as: 
@Credit=@CorpDisclosure ¼   0:0308þ 0:0077Rights; where Rights can be evaluated at the mean, lowest, or highest 
values.
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The significance of corporate disclosure in influencing credit market development is 
not evident in high-income countries. For the most part, it is negative and statistically 
significant in upper–middle-income countries.
We observe a negative and insignificant effect of corporate disclosure on credit market 
development in lower-middle-income countries in Table 6. It differs from what we 
observe in low-income countries where the effect is significant but disproportionate. 
Under the RE and FE columns, corporate disclosure exerts both positive and negative 
statistically significant effect on credit market development at the 1% and 5% significance 
levels. Approximately, corporate disclosure explains between 15% and 33% changes in 
credit market development in low-income countries, holding other factors constant. The 
implication is that corporate disclosure significantly predicts credit market development 
in low-income countries when creditor’s rights protection is accounted for.
The results of the SYS-GMM analysis are reported in Table 7. It is evident that in the 
full sample, corporate disclosure drives credit markets positively which upholds the 
results in Table 3. In terms of income groups, it is only in low-income group that 
corporate disclosure drives credit markets positively.
The results in Tables 4–7 support the postulation that the effect of corporate disclosure 
on credit market development differs according to the income groups of countries which 
becomes more distinct with the incorporation of creditor’s rights and the interaction 
term. Generally, the results in Tables 4–7 show that in the presence of creditor rights 
protection, corporate disclosure does not support credit market development except in 
the upper–middle-income and low-income countries where some weak positive effect is 
observed. The “liquidation bias” hypothesis is invoked to explain this outcome. Credited 
to Vig (2013) and Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011), the ‘liquidation bias” hypothesis 
posits that in an environment where the legal system is effective and potent, managers 
exhibit some reluctance to borrow more for fear of losing their jobs in an event of firms 
becoming bankrupt. Thus, managers of transparent firms operating in an effective 
creditor rights protection environment are reluctant to borrow more for fear of liquida-
tion risk. As a result, credit markets plummet.
Apart from the results in Tables 4 to 7 assisting us to answer the second question 
raised in this study, they also help us to address two concerns: robustness of the effect of 
corporate disclosure on credit market development and the external validity of our 
results. First, the positive and significant effect of corporate disclosure on credit market 
development observed in high-, upper–middle-, lower–middle-income- and low-income 
countries7 strengthens the result reported in Table 3 that corporate disclosure promotes 
credit market development. Second, in our view, the positive effect of corporate dis-
closure on credit market development across the four income groups establishes the 
external validity of the results observed in Table 3.
5. Conclusion
As far as we know, the empirical literature does not clearly manifest the effect of 
corporate disclosure on credit market development. The objective of this study is to 
illuminate this murky area of the empirical literature. In pursuing this objective, we 
7Relying substantially on the LSDV results in Table 4.
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employ data from 122 countries and engage three estimation techniques. The various 
estimations performed in this study have yielded results that generally suggest that 
corporate disclosure drives credit market development positively. Subsample analysis 
in terms of income groups of the countries provides some interesting findings. Generally, 
without accounting for creditor rights protection and its interaction with corporate 
disclosure, corporate disclosure accelerates credit market development in high-income 
-, upper–middle- and lower–middle-income and shows no significant effect on the credit 
markets in low-income countries.8 However, we observe a different outcome when 
creditor rights protection interacts with corporate disclosure: generally, corporate dis-
closure impairs credit market development in all income groups except in upper-middle- 
income countries where a positive and statistically significant effect is observed. The main 
policy implication of these results is that policy intervention either at the firm or national 
level that enhances the transparency of firms could have positive effects on the develop-
ment of credit markets especially in high-income, upper-middle-income and lower- 
middle-income countries. It also implies that among the four income groups, it is in 
only in upper–middle-income countries that the simultaneous promotion of corporate 
disclosure and creditor rights protection will be beneficial to credit market development, 
ceteris paribus.
To the extent that corporate disclosure supports credit market development, policy 
interventions that promote corporate transparency represent one of the channels for 
facilitating the development of credit markets in the study countries. From the agency 
theory perspective, active credit markets benefit shareholders because debt financing is 
perceived as a layer in the monitoring scheme of shareholders to checkmate managerial 
excesses. Consequently, shareholders of corporate entities in the study countries inter-
ested in deploying debt financing as an additional mechanism should direct their 
activism at corporate disclosure. Pushing their firms to ensure transparency in their 
operations, which will fertilize access to credit markets when the need arises, constitutes 
one way of mitigating the agency conflict between them and their managers.
Theoretically, the reduction in the effect of corporate disclosure on credit market 
development when we control for creditor rights protection coupled with the observation 
that the interaction between corporate disclosure and creditor rights protection generally 
slows down credit markets in three income groups supports the conclusion that corpo-
rate disclosure and credit rights protection are not complementary. Therefore, it may not 
be necessary to target the two in the quest to promote the development of credit markets 
in the study countries save upper-middle-income countries. In our view, corporate 
disclosure alone may have the potency to influence credit markets positively.
While articulating the relevance of the findings of this study to the credit market 
literature, it is essential to invite future research to interrogate further the issues 
addressed in the paper to deepen the understanding of the effect of corporate dis-
closure on credit market development. Evidence from a different econometric 
approach using a larger sample size will be a step in the right direction. Besides, lack 
of consistency in the sign of the coefficient of the interaction between corporate 
disclosure and creditor rights protection requires that the question of the effect of 
the interaction between corporate disclosure and creditor rights protection on the 
8Relying on the LSDV results in 4a
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development of credit markets remains open for further interrogation. Future research 
can take this up.
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Appendix A.  
Countries, regions, and income groups.
S/ 
N Country Region Income group S/N Country Region Income group
1 Albania ECA Upper-Middle 62 Kosovo ECA Lower-Middle
2 Afghanistan SA Low 63 Kuwait MENA High
3 Algeria MENA Upper-Middle 64 Kyrgyzstan ECA Lower-Middle
4 Angola SSA Lower-Middle 65 Latvia ECA High
5 Antigua and Barbuda LAC High 66 Lebanon MENA Upper-Middle
6 Argentina LAC High 67 Lesotho SSA Lower-Middle
7 Armenia ECA Upper-Middle 68 Lithuania ECA High
8 Australia EAP High 69 Luxembourg ECA High
(Continued)
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S/ 
N
Country Region Income group S/N Country Region Income group
9 Austria ECA High 70 Madagascar SSA Low
10 Bangladesh SA Lower-Middle 71 Malawi SSA Low
11 Belarus ECA Upper-Middle 72 Malaysia EAP Upper-Middle
12 Belgium ECA High 73 Maldives SA Upper-Middle
13 Bhutan SA Lower-Middle 74 Malta MENA High
14 Bolivia LAC Lower-Middle 75 Mauritius SSA Upper-Middle
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina ECA Upper-Middle 76 Mexico LAC Upper-Middle
16 Botswana SSA Upper-Middle 77 Moldova ECA Lower-Middle
17 Brazil LAC Upper-Middle 78 N. Macedonia ECA Upper-Middle
18 Brunei EAP High 79 Namibia SSA Upper-Middle
19 Bulgaria ECA Upper-Middle 80 Netherlands ECA High
20 Burundi SSA Low 81 Nicaragua LAC Lower-Middle
21 Cameroon SSA Lower-Middle 82 Nigeria SSA Lower-Middle
22 Central Afr. Republic SSA Low 83 Norway ECA High
23 Chad SSA Low 84 Pakistan SA Lower-Middle
24 Chile LAC High 85 Panama LAC High
25 China EAP Upper-Middle 86 Papua New Guinea EAP Lower-Middle
26 Colombia LAC Upper-Middle 87 Paraguay LAC Upper-Middle
27 Costa Rica LAC Upper-Middle 88 Peru LAC Upper-Middle
28 Croatia ECA High 89 Philippines EAP Lower-Middle
29 Cyprus ECA High 90 Poland ECA High
30 Czech Republic ECA High 91 Portugal ECA High
31 Denmark ECA High 92 Romania ECA Upper-Middle
32 Djibouti MENA Lower-Middle 93 Russia ECA Upper-Middle
33 Dominica LAC Upper-Middle 94 Rwanda SSA Low
34 Dominican Republic LAC Upper-Middle 95 St. Kitts and Nevis LAC High
35 Ecuador LAC Upper-Middle 96 St. Lucia LAC Upper-Middle
36 El Salvador LAC Lower-Middle 97 St. Vincent and the Grenadines LAC Upper-Middle
37 Equatorial Guinea SSA Upper-Middle 98 Saudi Arabia MENA High
38 Estonia ECA High 99 Seychelles SSA High
39 Eswatini SSA Lower-Middle 100 Singapore EAP High
40 Fiji EAP Upper-Middle 101 Slovakia ECA High
41 Finland ECA High 102 Slovenia ECA High
42 France ECA High 103 Solomon Islands EAP Lower-Middle
43 Gabon SSA Upper-Middle 104 South Africa SSA Upper-Middle
44 Gambia SSA Low 105 South Korea EAP High
45 Georgia ECA Lower-Middle 106 Spain ECA High
46 Germany ECA High 107 Sri Lanka SA Lower-Middle
47 Ghana SSA Lower-Middle 108 Switzerland ECA High
48 Greece ECA High 109 Tanzania SSA Low
49 Grenada SSA Upper-Middle 110 Thailand EAP Upper-Middle
50 Guatemala LAC Upper-Middle 111 Tonga EAP Upper-Middle
51 Guinea SSA Low 112 Trinidad and Tobago LAC High
52 Honduras LAC Lower-Middle 113 Turkey ECA Upper-Middle
53 Hungary ECA High 114 United Arab Emirates MENA High
54 Iceland ECA High 115 Uganda SSA Low
55 India SA Lower-Middle 116 United Kingdom ECA High
56 Indonesia EAP Lower-Middle 117 Ukraine ECA Upper-Middle
57 Ireland ECA High 118 United States of America NA High
58 Israel MENA High 119 Uruguay LAC High
59 Italy ECA High 120 Vanuatu EAP Lower-Middle
60 Kazakhstan ECA Upper-Middle 121 Vietnam EAP Lower-Middle
61 Kenya SSA Lower-Middle 122 Zambia SSA Lower-Middle
Notes: EAP: Europe and the Asia Pacific; ECA: Europe and Central Asia; LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean; ME: the 
Middle East and North Africa; NA: North America; SA: South Asia; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa 
Source: Authors’ Compilation
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